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THE SUPREME COURT’S RENEWED FOCUS ON
INEFFICIENTLY STRUCTURED JOINT VENTURES
Stephen F. Ross*
Antitrust courts and commentators have long appreciated that joint
ventures among rival firms have the potential to provide benefits to
consumers and the economy through synergies and economies of scale, but
also raise the potential of lessening competition among the venture
principals. The case law and academic literature have often ignored,
however, the potential harm that befalls consumers when joint ventures
with market power are structured in a manner that gives the principals the
ability to direct policy and a strategy in a manner that advances their
parochial self-interest, rather than the interests of the venture-as-a-whole.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Needle, Inc., v. NFL
properly focused on the difference between a single economic entity (like a
corporation) and the typical sports league, which is governed by club
owners who act in the interests of their own clubs. It suggests a renewed
opportunity for antitrust enforcers to consider the structure of joint
ventures that do not face rigorous competition from other providers of
similar goods and services, when analyzing antitrust challenges to either
specific venture decisions, or to the structure of the venture itself. In this
regard, this Essay proposes a workable standard for evaluating joint
ventures, focusing on whether decision makers have a fiduciary duty to,
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and economic incentives aligned with, the profitability of the venture-as-awhole.
INTRODUCTION
In markets that do not feature vigorous competition among many
independent firms, two discrete anticompetitive problems can arise when
separate economic actors agree to cooperate with each other. The foremost
concern is that consumers will be harmed by the elimination of competition
among the parties to the agreement. But, when the parties’ agreement is
not a complete integration of economic activities through merger,
consumers also face the risk that the parties’ partial integration (usually
labeled as a ‘joint venture’) will be inefficiently structured, allowing
individual firms’ independent self-interests to block welfare-maximizing
initiatives that may benefit consumers and the firm-as-a-whole. Indeed,
successful joint ventures are rare because, among other reasons, companies
with different interests, management styles, and goals find it difficult to
cooperate on a practical level as business partners.1 Inefficient decisionmaking by firms that face vigorous rivals do not harm consumers, who can
switch their patronage to substitute goods and services. But when the
venture offers goods or services for which there are no reasonable
substitutes, consumers may find themselves victimized to a greater degree
than those subject to Standard Oil or Microsoft’s monopolistic practices:
not only suffer from the price increases or quality unresponsiveness that
follows from the elimination of competition, but also from the peculiar
inefficiencies of cartel-like behavior.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Needle, Inc., v.
NFL reaffirms the Sherman Act’s potency in protecting consumers against
both these harms.2 The Court explicitly held that § 1 of the Sherman Act,
which bans unreasonable agreements in restraint of trade,3 applies to
decisions of a putative ‘single entity’ when that entity is governed by
economically separate entities and “when the parties to the agreement act
on interests separate from those of the firm itself.”4 American Needle, Inc.,
a sporting goods manufacturer, could therefore challenge, as an
unreasonable conspiracy in restraint of trade, the decision by the club
owners who govern National Football League Properties (NFLP)—the

1. Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a
Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 63 n.3 (1987).
2. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
3. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”).
4. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2215.
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NFL’s marketing subsidiary—to grant a license for each NFL club’s logos
and trademarks to a single merchandise manufacturer.5 This was because,
as Justice Stevens explained for the unanimous Court in the final antitrust
opinion of his illustrious career, “each team’s decision reflects not only an
interest in NFLP’s profits but also an interest in the team’s individual
profits.”6 Thus, consistent with the approach announced in the Court’s
prior decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,7 the
league’s licensing policies were unlike “a multiple team of horses drawing
a vehicle under the control of a single driver,”8 but rather were properly
characterized as an agreement between competing clubs, such that the
agreement “deprive[d] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.”9
Although earlier work has discussed the importance of the way in
which decision-making occurs in joint ventures,10 and how individual
principals within ventures may prefer inefficient, output-reducing decisions
that are nonetheless profitable for their particular firm,11 this Essay explores
how American Needle can be implemented. This Essay also suggests
opportunities for new scrutiny of the inefficient structure of joint ventures
with market power. First, the Essay explicitly distinguishes two discrete
antitrust problems arising from joint ventures: Competition can be reduced
by the elimination of rivalry between the venture parties; consumer welfare
can also be reduced when the structure of an otherwise welfare-enhancing
joint venture is too likely to result in inefficient business decisions based on
the parochial self-interest of the venture’s principals. Second, the Essay
discusses how antitrust law should deal with these discrete problems, by
focusing first on the formation of a venture and next on its structure.
Although antitrust analysis of whether a joint venture’s formation is
anticompetitive has attracted significant judicial and scholarly discussion,12
proper analysis of a venture’s structure has been relatively ignored.13
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
Id. at 771.
Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2212, quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769.
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures].
11. Id. at 50. See also id. at 54 (“[T]he structure and nature of joint ventures is such
that they can often make decision in ways that do not maximize the profits of the venture as
a whole.”).
12. See generally A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, 1 ANTITRUST L. DEV. (6th ed.
2007), ch. 4 (discussing antitrust analysis of joint ventures); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework
for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1986); Joseph Brodley, Joint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint
Ventures, supra note 10, at 53.
13. Even Professor Brodley’s seminal work devotes minimal attention to the harm that
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This Essay argues that courts should not limit their inquiry to the
reduction of rivalry between the parties, but should consider structural
issues related to the venture as well. Courts should ascertain a venture’s
market power and then demarcate a clear line between those ventures
governed by decision-makers whose only incentives are to benefit the
venture-as-a-whole, and those ventures governed by decision-makers with
divergent economic and legal incentives. This focus tracks, although is not
identical to, the inquiry familiar to corporate lawyers with regard to relatedparty transactions.14 Where substance may not follow form, courts should
is the focus of this Essay. Brodley identifies collusion, loss of potential competition, and
market exclusion as three “anticompetitive risks” about which antitrust policy ought to be
concerned. Brodley, supra note 12, at 1530–34, and mentions only in passing the
transactions costs problems that joint ventures encounter when serving “two masters.” Id. at
1529. Likewise, Pitofsky’s important work expresses concern about lessened competition
between the principals, and between the joint venture and one or more principals, and
particular problems with rights of access. Pitofsky, supra note 12, at 1608–14. Even with
regard to access rights issues (which raise problems similar to those addressed in this Essay,
in that independently owned essential facilities would usually be happy to allow access to as
many firms willing to pay the monopoly price as possible), which typically arise where the
facility is controlled by one or more of the plaintiff’s rivals, the Pitofsky article does not
discuss the structure of the venture as a critical variable warranting close antitrust scrutiny.
The leading study to address this is Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures, supra note 10,
although the issue is not the principal focus of his article. Hovenkamp returns to this issue
in Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 813 (2011) [hereinafter Hovenkamp & Leslie].
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle, a veteran
Antitrust Division economist has addressed this issue, observing, consistent with the
conclusions of this Essay, that “a joint venture is treated as a single economic entity when
its participants can be expected to maximize the venture’s profits rather than act on the
interests they have outside the venture.” Gregory J. Werden, Two Propositions on the
Application of the Sherman Act to Joint Ventures after Dagher and American Needle (May
2011) (on file with author). The decision in American Needle is thoughtfully reviewed in
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1478d, at 350–67 (3d ed.
2010) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP].
14. With regard to conflicts of interest in joint ventures, the prime focus of corporate
law literature is on acts of commission, typically the seizing of a corporate opportunity by a
venture party that allegedly should have been taken by the joint venture. Another sort of
conflict is also problematic: acts of omission where individual venture partners block
initiatives that will enhance the venture’s overall profitability, but not in a uniform way.
Suppose Steve, Marco, and Sam create the SMS commercial real estate venture with
unanimous consent required for major decisions. The question of Steve’s liability if he were
to individually secure a good bargain to develop a new shopping mall, instead of allowing
SMS to make the investment, is discussed in detail in Shishido, supra note 1, at 91–112,
building upon the framework articulated in Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look
at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1047 (1981) and A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1986). Far less attention is paid if Marco were to veto SMS’s lucrative investment because
he did not want a new mall to compete with an existing shopping mall in which he
individually had a large investment. Professor Shishido sensibly observes that the problem
of minority oppression is less acute in joint ventures than in closely held corporations,
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inquire whether there is a possibility that the joint venture’s governance is
structured in a manner that creates a significant risk that the decision will
be inconsistent with the interests of the entity as a whole. This approach
draws on the Supreme Court’s doctrine of distinguishing agreements from
parallel independent behavior.15 In reviewing challenges to decisions made
by joint ventures with market power that are controlled by self-interested
principals, courts should closely scrutinize the challenged decision for
reasonableness. Additionally, in cases of persistent unreasonableness,
courts should evaluate whether consumer welfare would be enhanced by
structural relief requiring that the venture be governed by those solely
concerned with the venture-as-a-whole.
Finally, the Essay applies this approach to a structural variation on
American Needle, to an earlier sports broadcasting decision that was
settled, and to non-sports antitrust litigation involving credit card
processing ventures. These cases illustrate how close scrutiny, and in some
cases structural relief, can more effectively protect consumers against
welfare-reducing, parochially self-interested decisions by firms that control
joint ventures with market power.16
I.

TWO DISCRETE PROBLEMS

When competition is not so vigorous that firms who disserve
consumers face swift retribution,17 two discrete anticompetitive problems
may arise from a joint venture in that market. The first is the wellrecognized formation problem: Consumer welfare may be significantly
reduced by eliminating competition between the parties in the relevant
because the parties tend to be sophisticated economic actors who each contribute to the
venture, giving each party negotiating leverage. Shishido, supra note 1, at 72. Although
these factors may well allow venture parties to protect their own interests, the venture
cannot be relied upon to protect the public interest in the efficient operation of a venture
with market power.
15. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) (stating that conspiracy requires evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” that
the defendants’ conduct was independent).
16. There may well be situations where (i) a joint venture’s benefits outweigh harms;
(ii) centralized control limits competition; and (iii) allocating governance rights to
individual principals actually benefits consumers, in the same way that consumers benefit
when a member of a cartel ‘cheats’ on an anti-competitive agreement. See Hovenkamp &
Leslie, supra note 13 (providing an analysis of cartel management). Consistent with the
approach advocated in this Essay, these situations are best identified by antitrust courts’
holding that the venture in question is not a single entity, but under § 1, a decentralized
governance structure is the lawful approach for the venture to adopt.
17. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Redfield Imp., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.) (“A firm that has no market power is unlikely to adopt policies that disserve its
consumers; it cannot afford to. And if it blunders and does adopt such a policy, market
retribution will be swift.”).
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market, in which case the appropriate antitrust result is to bar collaboration
and restore rivalry between the joint venture principals. Alternatively, and
beyond the scope of this Essay, the formation of a joint venture may be
problematic because the agreement forming the venture includes
unnecessary collateral restraints on the parties’ non-venture behavior, in
which case the appropriate antitrust result is to invalidate those restraints
while permitting the pro-competitive aspects of the venture to proceed.
The second is a structural problem: Consumer welfare may be enhanced
by some form of collaboration among the parties, but policies or
agreements that flow from the self-interest of the individual parties may
reduce consumer welfare. Moreover, a venture structured to vest decisionmaking authority in those solely interested in enhancing the venture-as-awhole may be more likely to produce a welfare-enhancing result that
offsets any harm to competition caused by the limitation on rivalry of the
venture partners. An inefficiently structured joint venture with market
power is likely to produce a result akin to a problem economists have
identified as one of double monopoly, where consumers are harmed by
monopoly profits and further harmed if a second monopolist handles
distribution.18
The Second Circuit recognized this second structural problem in an
early sports antitrust decision.19 Rebuffing the same single entity argument
that the Supreme Court rejected in American Needle, the court expressed its
concern about two different types of harms that might occur if the antitrust
laws did not constrain sports team owners’ decisions. First, the Second
Circuit noted that sports leagues could enter into agreements that would
benefit the league, but that anticompetitive effects would outweigh these
benefits. Second, the court observed that sports leagues might adopt the
restraint more for their own protection from competition, than for the
welfare of the league itself.20
18. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy
Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 7 (2004) (citing DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 398 (3d ed. 1999)); see generally Roger D.
Blair, David L. Kaserman, & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral
Monopoly, 55 SO. ECON. J. 831, 831 (1989) (explaining the theory’s foundation as
developed in AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPLES MATHEMATIQUES DE LA
THEORIE DES RICHESSES (1838) (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., RESEARCHES INTO THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1927)).
19. N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982).
20. Id.
The characterization of the NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt
from the Sherman Act an agreement between its members to restrain
competition. To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would
benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the restraint
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The concurring opinion in an earlier single entity case clearly
expressed the point. Judge Richard Cudahy, disagreeing with the panel
majority’s suggestion that the National Basketball Association might be
considered a single entity with respect to broadcasting rules,21 believed the
league was more like a joint venture whose agreements should be subject to
analysis under § 1. According to Judge Cudahy, joint ventures warrant
antitrust scrutiny
for at least two reasons—(1) the venture could possess market
power with respect to the jointly produced product (essentially
act like a single firm with monopoly power) or (2) the fact that
the venturers remain competitors in other arenas might either
distort the way the joint product is managed or allow the ventures
to use the joint product as a smokescreen behind which to cut
deals to reduce competition in other areas.22

might be one adopted more for the protection of individual league members
from competition than to help the league.
Id. (emphasis added). Suggesting that sports league owners might be subject to antitrust
liability for an agreement that enhanced the league’s ability to compete, because the
agreement might be outweighed by anticompetitive effects, has been characterized as
“nonsense” by the leading academic advocate of the now-rejected view that sports leagues
should be treated as single entities. See Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of
Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 943 n.4 (1988). Dean Roberts perhaps exaggerates, but agreements
among competitors that enhanced the league’s ability to compete by increasing consumer
appeal would typically be questioned only under the monopolization precedents of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Craig R. Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:
Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999).
Roberts’s concern is overstated, though, as there does not appear to be any precedent where
a court actually held that a sports league agreement found to be reasonably necessary to
enable the league to more effectively compete in a broader market was nonetheless struck
down because of some overall balancing of effects. Dean Roberts accurately states that the
“concepts of competition and consumer welfare demand that every producer act vigorously
to make itself optimally efficient.” However, he overlooks the fact that sports leagues
governed by self-interested club owners often do not act in ways that are efficient. Roberts,
supra, at 943 n.4. See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE
WORLD, UNITE! A (CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS 7–9, 14–22 (2008)
(providing a catalogue of examples).
21. This suggestion has been reversed by the Supreme Court’s decision in American
Needle. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010).
22. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Once a court has determined that a joint
venture’s decisions will not be checked by marketplace rivalry, the significant risk to
consumers means that finding club-run sports leagues to be single entities would result in a
high chance of false negatives (dismissing cases where anti-competitive conduct exists), and
thus the time and expense of antitrust litigation to closely scrutinize the decisions of
conflict-ridden leagues would be justified. Thus, this argument is also consistent with the
view that courts maximize consumer welfare by adopting rules that account for error costs
and administrative costs. Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead!
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An illustration of “distortion” in league management arguably
occurred concerning the sale of broadcast rights by the clubs in soccer’s
English Premier League (EPL). In the early 1990s, EPL clubs agreed to
bar individual clubs from negotiating broadcast rights arrangements, and to
collectively sell the rights to 60 of the 380 games each year to Sky Sports, a
satellite programmer. In doing so, the EPL clubs precluded competition
that would have resulted in many more games being telecast, which would
have driven down the per game rights fees.23 More curiously, the EPL
clubs rejected an offer from Sky Sports to televise an additional thirty
games for a commensurately higher fee, because the clubs could not agree
on how to divide the additional profits.24 Consumers thus suffered doubly:
first, by the reduction of output from that which would occur if clubs sold
their rights individually, and second, by the reduction of output below a
monopolist’s profit-maximizing level, because of inefficiencies in market
structure.
II.

FORMATION V. STRUCTURE

Antitrust courts should evaluate challenges to joint venture decisions
with a clear focus on formation and structure. First, courts should
determine if consumers can readily protect themselves against exploitation
by shifting their patronage to substitute goods and services; if so, there is
no cause for competitive concern and the inquiry ends.25 Second, courts
should review the venture’s formation: if the venture should be dissolved
and the principals required to compete, rather than collaborate, then further
inquiry is required.26 Third, if the venture carries the potential for procompetitive benefits, notwithstanding the absence of vigorous rivalry from
competitors, the court should examine whether the venture’s structure
Long Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2010 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 369, 398 (2010).
23. A natural experiment of this phenomenon occurred in the 1980s in American
college football. Annual rights fees in excess of $75 million dropped sharply in value after
the Supreme Court outlawed the NCAA’s strict output limiting rules in NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The result was a reduction in prices per game from just under
$1 million per game to $250,000, a slight increase in total game attendance, and the
televising of nearly three times as many games. PAUL C. WEILER, GARY R. ROBERTS, ROGER
I. ABRAMS & STEPHEN F. ROSS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 887–88 (4th ed. 2011).
24. ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20, at 8.
25. Cf. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (stating that
“when interbrand competition exists . . . it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand
of the same product”).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (enjoining a joint venture to create a pay television network among the four
major motion picture studios).
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poses significant risks of competitive harm.
Antitrust resolution of formation issues closely resembles merger
analysis about which enforcers and practitioners have developed significant
expertise. Courts and agencies focus on the relevant markets in which the
joint venture is likely to compete, and on whether the resulting reduction or
elimination of competition among the parties to the venture presents too
great a risk of consumer exploitation. Even if there is a significant risk that
rivals will not constrain the venture’s ability to impose higher prices, lower
output, or output unresponsive to consumer demand,27 the venture may
promise sufficient efficiencies to enhance overall consumer welfare. For
example, a venture may prove necessary to create new and distinct
products.
Potential efficiencies from a joint venture may therefore justify
competitor collaboration despite the lack of swift market retribution from
rivals.
Thus, the federal government’s Competitor Collaboration
Guidelines provide that antitrust agencies will examine the markets in
which joint ventures will operate and, even if such an examination
indicates anticompetitive harms, the investigation will turn to “whether the
relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive
benefits that likely would offset anticompetitive harms.”28
Certainly, the National Football League would claim that this is true
of their league. In these cases, American Needle signals the importance of
considering the structure of the venture. The Court’s analysis requires
newfound emphasis on the likely effect of price, output, and consumer
choice, and on whether decisions by a joint venture are being made by
those solely interested in the success of the venture, or by those with
interests separate from the firm.29 Where the structure of a venture allows
the management to be solely concerned about the profitability of the overall
firm, the venture’s post-formation decisions should be considered those of
a single entity. When management decisions reflect not only an interest in
the venture’s profits, but also an interest in the parties’ individual profits,
further antitrust scrutiny is required.30 In the latter case, decisions of a joint
27. This is the test articulated by the Court in NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107. The focus on
responsiveness to consumer demand is emphasized and expounded upon in Neil W. Averitt
& Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 230 (2007).
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
29. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010) (reversing
judgment for summary judgment for respondents’ Sherman Act § 1 claim of antitrust
violations due to the collective decision-making regarding their individual enterprises that
thereby prevented market choices).
30. Id.
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venture with conflicting interests should be independently assessed under
the rule of reason to determine their impact on price, output, and consumer
responsiveness. A government or private complaint may seek equitable
relief to restructure the venture so that control is not vested in those with
parochial interests.31
This approach parallels corporate law’s business judgment rule. The
rule states that if a single corporation’s decisions are made by executives or
boards of directors whose economic interests lie solely in the profitability
of the corporation, courts should not second guess their judgment.32 If
decisions are made by those who can economically benefit, either from

31. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 16 (1945) (striking down a
by-law giving member newspapers a veto over applications to join the collaboration by local
rivals). Somewhat inconsistent with this approach is that followed by the antitrust
enforcement agencies, as set forth in the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra
note 28, § 1.3. According to the Guidelines, when firms form a venture to eliminate entirely
all competition between themselves in a relevant market, the federal antitrust agencies state
that the venture will be analyzed as a merger. This does not raise concerns where vigorous
competition exists in the market, or when the elimination of competition itself lessens
competition so that the venture’s formation would constitute a substantial lessening of
competition in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). The agencies’
approach is problematic if a merger analysis results in the conclusion that vigorous
competition will not remain in the market, but that the venture should be permitted to go
forward because any potential harms from the venture’s ability to exercise market power are
outweighed by demonstrable efficiencies. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2010), http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08
/100819hmg.pdf (illustrating a set of guidelines pertaining to the federal antitrust laws that
outline the set forms of analysis and applications of policy of the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission regarding mergers and acquisitions of possible competitors).
In this instance, there is a risk that the venture’s structure could lead the principals to reduce
output or render output unresponsive to consumer demand in the relevant market, not for the
purpose of achieving monopoly profits in that market, but to protect some strategic
parochial advantage for one of the principals in another market. For example, in American
Needle, the NFL clubs agreed to eliminate competition between themselves in the licensed
merchandise market. Suppose the reviewing agency were to conclude that this gave NFL
Properties market power, but the efficiencies of joint licensing outweighed the harms.
Because NFL Properties is governed by the member clubs acting in their own parochial
interests, there is a risk that consumers of licensed hats and jerseys may suffer because the
owners would forego business initiatives that would hurt their ability to compete in the labor
market. A literal reading of the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES would preclude
an evaluation of that risk, or the possibility of requiring NFL Properties to structure its
venture so as to place decision-making in the hands of those solely concerned with the
overall welfare of NFL Properties. In contrast, in a real merger, this risk is absent because
the merged company will have a single governance structure. Absent § 1.3, the typical joint
venture approach would apply to the creation of NFL Properties; thus, where there is a
likelihood of anticompetitive harm, the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES direct the
agency staff to focus on “Control of the Collaboration’s Competitively significant Decision
Making,” and “the extent to which the collaboration’s governance structure enables the
collaboration to act as an independent decision maker.” Id. § 3.34(d).
32. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).

ROSS_FINALIZED_FIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

INEFFICIENTLY STRUCTURED JOINT VENTURES

271

enhancing corporate profitability or from a decision that fails to optimize
corporate wealth but allows individual profit, the court should review, with
care, the details of the transaction to assure that the result is in the best
interests of the corporation.33
This approach is also consistent with the long-standing antitrust
treatment of potentially anticompetitive practices arising in the context of
franchise relationships.
Decisions that lessen competition among
franchisees, resulting from agreements by self-interest rival franchisees, are
subject to close antitrust scrutiny. However, the very same decision that
demonstrably comes from the unilateral decision of a franchisor motivated
by maximizing profits for the enterprise is evaluated differently.34 A
typical franchise policy is not the product of a conspiracy among
franchisees, because the decision is not a joint one made by them but a
unilateral one made by the franchisor.35
There are a wide variety of joint ventures—sports leagues being
among the most well-known—where the elimination of some competition
between rivals creates market power, but also results in significant
efficiencies and consumer benefits through the ability of the parties to offer
products that inherently require collaboration. Other examples recognized
by courts include the collaboration among holders of musical copyrights
for blanket licenses of all music in their repertoire,36 and various standard-

33. Compare id. at 780 (“we do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision
of the directors was a correct one . . . . the decision is one properly before directors and the
motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest
in their making of that decision”), with Croton River Club v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners
Ass’n, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting a decision made by a corporate director
with interest in the decision renders the business judgment rule inapplicable and the burden
is on board to “demonstrate that its actions were reasonable and/or fair”) (citing Alpert v. 28
Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. 1984)).
34. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966); see also Brief for
the United States at 22, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9) (“the
source of the territorial restriction is not an independent third party but the very sellers
whom the restriction is designed to shield from competition”).
35. See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise
Systems after American Needle, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 220 (2011) (“Franchise systems
generally are much more likely than the NFL and NFLP arrangements to pass the critical
test that the arrangement does not bring together separate decision makers. NFLP was
controlled by the NFL teams, which were potential economic competitors; the decision to
grant exclusive licenses was made by a vote of the teams. In contrast, numerous operational
decisions in many franchise systems are made by (or, at least, are subject to approval by)
one decision maker, i.e., the franchisor.”). See also Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F.
Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev. 1992) (emphasizing the degree of control exercised by the
dominant corporation), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993).
36. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (holding
that blanket licenses, created by music companies that act as clearinghouses for copyright
owners, were not per se violations of price fixing under antitrust law).
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setting organizations.37 When a venture with market power is structured so
that its decisions are distorted by the parochial self-interest of individual
principals, consumers are likely to suffer. To successfully protect
consumers, American Needle will hopefully facilitate a renewed focus on
the governance of the venture, perhaps even mandating that parties
structure the venture so that it operates efficiently, and that initiatives that
are both welfare-enhancing and profit-maximizing are not thwarted by the
parochial self-interest of individual principals.
There are several ways for courts or enforcers to determine whether a
decision reflects the interests of the firm as a whole or parochial selfinterest. Where the formal structure of a joint venture vests effective
decision-making authority in persons whose legal and economic incentives
lie exclusively with the promotion of the profitability of the venture as a
whole, then absent a showing of sham, pretext, or other evidence that the
decision reflects parochial interests, the venture’s subsequent decisions
should be considered as those of a single entity. Where the structure is
more ambiguous, courts can borrow from the antitrust test for the existence
of multi-party conspiracies: is there evidence that the decision is
inconsistent with that of the venture as a whole, but consistent with the
interests of individual members? Since this is a threshold question, the lack
of evidence of any conflict between the venture as a whole and individual
members should result in summary dismissal of a complaint challenging
particular venture decisions. However, to avoid summary dismissal, it
should be sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that a conflict-ridden
decision is plausible. A rule of reason analysis is appropriate to determine
if indeed the challenged decision is inefficient and welfare-reducing.
The proposed two-part test requires defendants seeking to dismiss
Sherman Act § 1 claims on single entity grounds to demonstrate that the
challenged decision was made by those with both a legal and economic
duty to act for the venture as a whole. This is superior to language in some
pre-Needle lower court decisions that suggest a disjunctive test. For
example, an otherwise insightful Ninth Circuit decision recognized the
significant collaborative benefits of a multiple listing service for real estate
brokers.38 However, the court rejected a claim that a corporation set up by
potential competitor associations was a single entity with regard to the
challenged policy because the decision was made by those with
independent economic interests.39 In doing so, the court observed that
“[w]here there is substantial common ownership, a fiduciary obligation to
37. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW § 35.2d (2002) (describing the legal treatment of standard-setting organizations).
38. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 1151.
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act for another entity’s economic benefit or an agreement to divide profits
and losses, individual firms function as an economic unit and are generally
treated as a single entity.”40 This language is a bit imprecise. Firms with
market power that have substantial common ownership could well disserve
consumers if the degree of unshared profits is sufficient to lead a
significant shareholder minority to block a welfare-enhancing, ventureprofiting innovation. A fiduciary duty to act for the interests of the venture
as a whole, in theory, should be sufficient to allow antitrust courts to
presume that actions do in fact reflect venture-maximizing conduct.
However, fiduciary duty is a private law remedy and there are a variety of
reasons why parties could flaunt this duty, with resulting public harm.41
Finally, a division of profits and losses with regard to joint venture
activities is insufficient by itself to remove the likelihood that firms might
have outside competitive interests that would lead them to distort the
venture’s operations to further parochial self-interest.42
Sports antitrust cases litigated prior to American Needle are consistent
with this approach. In the landmark Raiders case,43 the jury’s verdict
against the NFL was upheld based on evidence that the relocation of the
Raiders’ home site from Oakland to Los Angeles posed no demonstrable
harm to the league, but was rejected by league owners in order to protect
the Los Angeles Rams (and, by way of precedent, their own clubs in future
cases) from the threat of new local competition.44 The plaintiffs’
evidence—having two teams in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and
only one in the San Francisco Bay Area was no less attractive for fans than
the reverse—showed that the NFL’s decision was inconsistent with that of
the venture as a whole.45 If a single shareholder owned the NFL, then if the
40. Id. at 1148 (emphasis added).
41. The ability of private investors with reasonable foresight to adequately protect their
own interests is a topic for corporate law, not this Essay. Reliance on private litigation for
breach of fiduciary duty or to challenge self-dealings that fall outside the business judgment
rule is insufficient to protect the public interest in the efficient operation of a venture with
market power. For this reason, sound antitrust policy requires that firms not be treated as
single-entities unless directors have both a legal and an economic interest in maximizing the
value of the venture as a whole. See also N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, No. 9343, 2011
LEXIS 137, at 118–122 (F.T.C. July 14, 2011) (rejecting the claim that ethical and legal
duties for self-interested dentists-regulators to enact regulations contrary to their own
economic interests precluded a finding that the adopted regulation constituted concerted
action among competing dentists).
42. See Block & Ridings, supra note 35, discussing how NFL teams that equally share
licensing income might block initiatives that increase overall league income if it resulted in
disproportionate benefits to other clubs that could lead those clubs to gain a competitive
advantage in labor markets.
43. Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th Cir.
1984).
44. Id. at 1395–97.
45. Id. at 1399.
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plaintiffs’ evidence is to be believed, she would have decreed that there
should be two teams in Los Angeles.46
Sullivan v. National Football League is another case where the
structure of a league’s governance may have affected league policy. The
case involved a challenge to the NFL’s unique rule barring club ownership
by corporations.47 The league observed that the policy actually reduced the
potential market value of clubs. (For this reason, the NFL argued
unsuccessfully that, as matter of antitrust doctrine, ownership interests in
sports clubs did not constitute a relevant market for antitrust purposes.)
However, the jury also heard evidence by prominent sports economist
Roger Noll that the rule’s effect was to preclude competition by more
efficient organizational structures. If believed, this evidence showed that
the owners had adopted a policy inconsistent with the best interests of the
NFL as a whole. That is to say, if a single shareholder owned the league
(like the France family owns NASCAR, a private corporation that
organizes the premier stock car auto racing competition in North
America),48 she would presumably prefer the most efficient mix of club
structures.
Labor market issues provide another illustration of how the structure
of a league can affect league policies. All sports leagues have an interest in
allocating athletic talent among the clubs in a manner designed to provide a
sporting competition that maximizes fan appeal (and thus revenue). Clubrun leagues, however, have a conflicting interest in holding down labor
costs, even at the expense of an appeal-maximizing competition. Whether
or not any particular club-adopted league policy is anticompetitive depends
on the individual facts. Several examples, however, illustrate this point.
Major League Baseball’s attendance and competitive balance improved
substantially after the strict “reserve clause” was lifted in 1976. MLB
owners were not foolish to have maintained a scheme that rendered output
unresponsive to consumer demand, however, because while attendance
indeed rose 57 percent in the seven-year period following the end of the
reserve clause, salaries during that period skyrocketed by 316 percent.49
Similarly, the National Hockey League enjoyed admirable competitive
balance at the turn of the century, with twelve different teams playing in
the Stanley Cup semi-finals over the 2002–04 seasons, but the clubs locked
players out for an entire season to secure a salary cap that prevents underperforming teams in major markets from improving to a level that their
fans demand.50 In contrast, consider the labor rules in two highly
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
NASCAR’s structure is detailed in ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20, at 70–108.
Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1989).
Stephen F. Ross, The NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, the Competition
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successful leagues where labor rules are not controlled by the clubs.
Although NASCAR has voluminous engineering rules designed to promote
competitive balance among competing race car teams, there are no rules
that prohibit star drivers or talented crew chiefs or engineers from
switching employers at the end of their existing contracts.51 An
independent board of directors who are concerned solely with the interests
of the overall league adopted a salary cap for the Indian Premier League.
Unlike North American sports leagues, the rules permit clubs who have
signed overpaid, underperforming players to buy out their contracts, release
them, and then bring in new talent, with any buyout payments not counted
against the cap.52 Thus, unlike under-performing NHL teams, inferior
Indian cricket teams can quickly improve by investing in better talent.
In sum, a workable standard to implement the Court’s renewed focus
on inefficiently structured joint ventures proceeds as follows. First, a
plaintiff would need to establish that a particular venture’s inefficiencies
will not be swiftly corrected by marketplace competition. Second, a
defendant would win summary dismissal of a § 1 claim where the venture’s
structure is such that the challenged decision was made by those whose
legal (i.e. fiduciary duty) and economic incentives were to maximize the
interests of the venture-as-a-whole. Where a venture’s structure was more
ambiguous, to survive summary dismissal the plaintiff would need to
present plausible evidence that the challenged decision(s) reflected
parochial self-interest of the venture’s principals.53
In a rapid-reaction “post-game commentary” on American Needle,
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp foreswears a categorical line-drawing test
such as the one I have proposed.54 Instead, he suggests that a critical
Act, and Public Policy, 37 U.B.C. L. REV. 343 (2004).
51. ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20 at 100–02.
52. Interview with Sean Morris, Chief Executive Officer, Rajasthan Royals (June 2,
2010).
53. A plaintiff can always challenge the formation of the venture itself.
54. Herbert Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust
Law June 1, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625 [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Firm
Boundaries]; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 365. Another advocate of a
categorical approach, Richard Brunell, has written, in regard to joint venture maven Joseph
Brodley’s work:
[it] suggests a straightforward answer to the question of when Copperweld should
apply to joint ventures: as long as the members that control the venture are
independent economic actors with interests that might diverge from the joint
venture as an independent business unit, then the venture should not be treated as
a single entity under § 1, regardless of the degree of functional integration or
economic interdependence of the members (short of a merger). While the Court
did not expressly adopt this test, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with it.
Richard M. Brunell, Professor Brodley’s General Contributions to Antitrust Scholarship:
Some Thoughts on Professor Brodley’s Contributions to Antitrust Through the Eye of
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criterion is whether the venture is conducting its own business rather than
being involved in the separate businesses of its individual team members.55
For example, he suggests that a league’s decision to fire an executive in the
commissioner’s office would not be subject to antitrust challenge.
Certainly, if the issue was the executive’s competence, it would be difficult
for the fired official to demonstrate that the decision was inconsistent with
the interests of the league as a whole. But suppose the league’s chief
marketing officer had advocated giving teams more of an entrepreneurial
incentive to innovate, and was then dismissed under pressure by club
owners who did not want to compete with each other in marketing?56
A league’s decision as to the schedule for regular season games is
another example that might be characterized as a league conducting “its
own business.” Typically, one would expect league schedules to be
designed to advance the overall welfare of the league, but not always. For
example, several years ago, the National Hockey League staff proposed a
schedule that increased the games played against clubs in the other
conference, which was designed to display the talent of stars like Pittsburgh
Penguin Sidney Crosby and Washington Capital Alex Ovechkin in west
coast venues. However, because schedules have to be approved by owners,
the east coast owners reportedly vetoed the schedule to reduce their own
travel costs.57 To be clear, not every single schedule dispute would be
subjected to a full-fledge rule of reason analysis under my approach. To
survive summary dismissal of a § 1 claim, the plaintiff would have to
provide plausible evidence that could lead a fact-finder to conclude that the
challenged decision was made by those with distinctive competitive
American Needle, 90 B. U. L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2010).
55. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13.
56. This analysis is consistent with the second look at this case in AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 357 (stating that league operations “should be regarded as
unilateral because, unless deeper probing shows otherwise, these decisions have no impact
on the market behavior of the individual teams”) (emphasis added).
57. At the owners’ meeting in January, 2007, a proposal to increase the number of interconference games on the NHL schedule was defeated on a 19–11 ownership vote, with twothirds required for passage. See Jody Vance, The Schedule Needs to be Fixed, Toronto Sun,
Jan. 25, 2007, at 38; Tarik El-Bashir, Live Online: The Washington Capitals,
washingtonpost.com, Jan. 26, 2007, 2:00PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2007/01/18/DI2007011801285.html.
There is one reported case suggesting that, contrary to the assumption made by all
parties in other sports league litigation, club owners who control league decisions indeed
owe a fiduciary duty to their fellow owners in making important league decisions. Prof’l
Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass’n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that when owners “sit on the board of directors of [the league], to the extent they
have common corporate goals, they have a duty to make decisions for the benefit of the
corporation, the hockey league as a whole”). There are no reported judicial or internal
league decisions suggesting that the owners in the four major North American professional
sports leagues perceive that they incur such a duty.
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interests (i.e., the owners) and that the decision was not likely one that
would have been made by those solely concerned with the profitability of
the league as a whole.58
The categorical approach’s clarity is exemplified by a post-Needle
sports decision, Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.59
The court of appeals properly rejected a challenge to a rule adopted by the
sanctioning body for motorsports dirt track racing that required all
competitors to use a single tire.60 The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’
own expert acknowledged that the decision to adopt the challenged rule
was made by the sanctioning body in its own best interest.61 Yet the court
went on in dicta to offer general commentary about the need to accord
“sports organizations a certain deference and freedom” with regard to
contracts with suppliers.62 Such deference is certainly justified when, as in
the case sub judice, the decision was made by an independent body. But

58. This result is not inconsistent with an alternative test suggested by the Justice
Department’s Antitrust Division in its amicus brief in American Needle: “teams act as a
single entity only with respect to aspects of their operations that have been effectively
merged, and only when the restraint does not affect competition among the teams, or the
teams and the league, outside their merged operations.” Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010) (No. 08-661). The NHL scheduling controversy arose because individual east coast
club owners did not merge their operations with regard to local broadcast rights, and
continued to compete on the ice, so that these owners were motivated to block a proposed
schedule that might optimize overall league revenues or league appeal. The Essay’s test is
superior, and indeed somewhat more favorable to leagues, in the instance where a league’s
owners may not have effectively merged all operations, but have vested decision-making
authority in those without parochial self-interest. See text accompanying note 60, infra,
discussing Major League Baseball Advanced Media.
The Justice Department’s amicus brief likewise glosses over this problem in a
blanket statement that “teams do not compete in establishing the rule of on-field play, but
rather have effectively merged their operation with respect to such decisions.” To use
another hockey example, consider the important rules changes adopted by the NHL after the
2005 lockout, designed to speed up the game, increase scoring, and increase the game’s
attractiveness to fans.
NHL, OFFICIAL RULES 1, 21, 31, 65, 89 (2005–06),
http://www.nhlofficials.com/images/Rules001-084.pdf.; NHL, NHL Enacts Rules Changes,
Creates Competition Committee, NHL.COM (July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/
ruleschanges072205.html. The new rules were not optimal for all teams: most notably, the
Minnesota Wild under legendary coach Jacques Lemaire used the old rules to prevail in
boring, defense-oriented contests.
Minnesota Wild Historical Moments, SPORTS
ECYCLOPEDIA
(June
17,
2011,
12:15
AM),
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nhl/minnesota/minwild.html. If a plaintiff could show
that a conflicted Board of Governors, acting in their own parochial commercial self-interest,
blocked a welfare-enhancing rule for on-ice play, that should be a legitimate basis for
antitrust review.
59. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57 (7th Cir. 2010).
60. Id. at 78.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 80.
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suppose the exact same rule had been adopted by a board consisting
entirely of existing racing teams, and that the plaintiff had credible
evidence that the rule was adopted to preclude innovative competition by
new drivers at the expense of established incumbents? A categorical
approach properly distinguishes, not on the basis of the substance of a rule,
but on the conflict-free nature of the decision to adopt the rule.
A prime focus on the incentives of decision-makers is fully consistent
with the Court’s earlier decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher.63 In that case,
rival oil companies Shell and Texaco combined all their retail marketing in
the western United States into a joint venture, Equilon. The Court held that
the complete integration of all economic activity in the relevant geographic
and product markets meant that the agreement was not per se illegal price
fixing.64 A challenge to the pricing scheme based on the elimination of
rivalry between Shell and Texaco could have been brought, but was not,
under the rule of reason.65 If, however, the venture’s formation was not
challenged, and the only challenge was to a post-formation decision by
Equilon to charge identical prices for Shell- and Texaco-brand products,
the decision would have been immune from § 1 scrutiny unless the plaintiff
could present evidence that the decision was not in the best interests of
Equilon, but rather was furthering some parochial interest of one or both
parties.66
III. APPLYING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH: THREE SCENARIOS
A review of three scenarios will hopefully demonstrate the value of a
categorical approach to the single entity issue, focusing on conflict-free
governance. Such an approach provides clear guidance in a manner
63. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., James A. Keyte, American Needle: A New Quick Look for Joint Ventures,
25 ANTITRUST 48, 50 (2010) (suggesting a wide range of unitary behavior (and, hence, no
§ 1 scrutiny for ongoing operations) for joint ventures structured like Equilon). Keyte
mistakenly concludes, id., that Dagher suggests that NFL Properties’ ongoing decisions
would be immune from § 1 scrutiny if NFL clubs’ intellectual property were lawfully
assigned to the league subsidiary. In Dagher, the principals structured the Equilon joint
venture so that Shell and Texaco were passive investors. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–4,
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) No. (04-805, 04-814), 2005 WL 2229874.
(describing joint venture principals’ gains and losses dependent on overall profitability of
the venture, so that the principals “stood in the same relation to the new [joint venture] as do
shareholders to a corporation”). Although not pursued by the plaintiffs, the Equilon venture
was most vulnerable to a rule of reason challenge (there was evidence that prices in some
local markets had increased post-venture) because the decision to price Shell- and Texacobrand gasoline identically was not a decision made by the Equilon joint venture after
formation, but a pre-venture requirement negotiated by Shell and Texaco in their own
parochial self-interest.
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consistent with the purposes for which the Court in Copperweld and
American Needle has drawn the distinction between collaborative and
unilateral conduct under the antitrust laws.
As the Court explained, decisions resulting from an agreement
between two or more economic actors require closer examination because
of their potential to harm consumers, while decisions of a single economic
actor (far more common in the economy) are less likely to harm consumers
absent a specific threat of monopolization.67 Justice Stevens noted that the
central evil addressed by § 1 is the elimination of competition that would
otherwise exist.68 When a decision is made by a joint venture controlled by
self-interested parties who retain some competitive relationship with one
another, there is a risk that the decision is not efficient, but rather designed
to stifle remaining competition between the principals. In contrast, when a
decision is made by a joint venture controlled by those solely concerned
with the interests of the venture-as-a-whole, this risk presumptively is
eliminated, and the sole question should be whether the venture’s initial
elimination of competition is lawful, and whether any subsequent decisions
risk monopolization.
First, a useful contrast might be drawn between NFL Properties, which
the Supreme Court concluded was an agreement among the thirty-two NFL
club owners, and Major League Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM).69
Unlike NFL Properties, which is governed by all NFL club owners,
MLBAM was established in 2000 as a business entity governed by a Board
of Directors including the MLB President (an executive working under the
Commissioner) and some but not all owners.70 Assuming that MLBAM’s
governing documents do not contain bizarre terms that would allow this
subset of owners to put their own club’s interests over those of the other
owners who are shareholders in the venture, decisions by MLBAM of how
to license properties assigned to it would presumptively be considered the
decision of a single entity. Under the categorical approach, because
MLBAM is governed by a board of directors whose members have a legal
obligation to act only in the best interests of MLBAM as a whole, a
plaintiff seeking to challenge a specific board decision would have to show
that the directors’ economic interests were sufficiently parochial as to
67. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010).
68. Id. at 2212.
69. Because Major League Baseball and its Advanced Media subsidiary are private
entities, they have not publicly revealed their Articles of Association or other documents
relating to corporate governance, and MLB officials declined to provide the author with
sufficient information on which to authoritatively base this analysis. Thus, the discussion
that follows is based on logical deductions from the limited publicly available information
about the relationship between MLB owners and MLB Advanced Media.
70. MLB Announces CEO For New Internet Initiative; Robert Bowman to Take The
Helm of MLB Advanced Media, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 17, 2000.
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trump their fiduciary duties. Absent such a showing, decisions should be
considered to be those of a single economic actor. Thus, the only
legitimate antitrust challenge to an MLBAM decision71 would be to attack
the initial assignment of club assets for the purpose of collective licensing.
A hypothetical marketing initiative exposing the conflict between the
individual clubs’ interests and those of the league as a whole illustrates
why American Needle properly found an NFL Properties’ decision to be an
agreement among member clubs, while a similar decision by MLBAM may
well be characterized as the decision of a single entity. Most American
sports leagues centralize virtually all marketing activities, although
European sports league merchandise is marketed almost exclusively by
each club. Suppose NFLP and MLBAM executives independently reached
the conclusion that neither extreme made sense, and that revenues could be
enhanced significantly by permitting clubs to license certain properties
themselves, keeping a small percent of the revenue and sharing the
remainder with NFLP or MLBAM. Suppose further that the league
executives concluded that the likely result of this initiative would not be to
enrich already wealthy clubs to such a degree that the fan appeal of the
game would decline due to undue competitive imbalance. In each case,
although this initiative would enrich the league as a whole, and make all
club owners better off collectively, some owners might do better than
others; owners whose clubs are under-performing, or whose club-level
marketing staff is below average, might perceive that their own interests
would be better served foregoing this business opportunity, lest their rivals
gain a competitive advantage. In the case of NFLP, a substantial minority
of owners, acting in their own self-interest, could (and likely would) block
the initiative. In the case of my stylized version of MLBAM, however, the
Board would likely approve it; more specifically, an owner who felt that his
own team was unlikely to be able to take advantage of this opportunity
would nonetheless have a fiduciary duty to support the initiative if there
was no question that it enriched MLBAM as a whole.
The second scenario is less hypothetical: how would American
Needle affect the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the NBA broadcast litigation
in Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA?72 Although Professor
Hovenkamp ultimately concludes that an NBA rule limiting individual

71. This assumes the inapplicability of the antitrust exemption created by the Supreme
Court in Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922), and reaffirmed in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
72. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). For a pre-American
Needle critique, see Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans,
Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 552–54 (1997) (describing the
performance of owners of major professional sports league to be inconsistent with notion of
fiduciary duty to other sports owners or to the league as a whole).
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clubs’ ability to sell broadcast rights nationally should be considered an
agreement among the club owners rather than the unilateral decision of the
NBA as a single entity, he finds this to be a closer and more difficult
question than I do.73 Whether one looks at the structure of the joint
venture, which is what Hovenkamp suggests Judge Easterbrook’s majority
opinion did, or looks to the nature of the challenged restraint and the extent
to which it may reflect independent and potentially competitive incentives,
which is how Hovenkamp characterizes Justice Stevens’ approach in
American Needle,74 the result is the same: the decision was made by the
NBA Board of Governors, who had no fiduciary duty or economic
incentive to act to maximize profitability for the league as a whole.
It may be true that, in some abstract sense, the NBA had an interest in
maximizing the revenue of the NBA as a whole,75 but as Judge Richard
Cudahy observed in his concurring opinion in the case,76 that interest is not
necessarily shared by the NBA Board of Governors, which is comprised of
each club’s owner or his designee. Per the Coase Theorem, NBA rules
would be irrelevant and the profit-maximizing result achieved in the
presence of perfect information and the absence of transactions costs.77
Neither condition exists with regard to sports licensing issues.
Ascertaining the economic impact of the Chicago Bulls broadcasting their
games nationally was uncertain and contested. Throughout the litigation,
the Bulls vigorously disputed the NBA’s claim that the telecasting of their
games on the WGN cable superstation had a significant adverse impact
either on the value of the NBA’s over-the-air network contract with NBC
or on the value of individual club’s local rights sales.78 As with other
73. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 18. The actual holding of the
Seventh Circuit in Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. reversed the district court’s holding that the
agreement was sufficiently anticompetitive that it could be barred on a quick look. Instead,
the court of appeals remanded the case for a full rule of reason analysis. 95 F.3d at 600. The
parties then settled the case.
74. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 15.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd., 95 F.3d at 601.
77. Roger G. Noll, Sports Economics after Fifty Years, SPORTS ECONOMICS AFTER FIFTY
YEARS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIMON ROTTENBERG 17, 25 (Plácido Rodríguez, Stefan
Késenne & Jaume García eds. 2006) (emphasizing the importance of the assumption of
perfect information and costless bargaining with regard to the Nobel Prize-winning insight
set forth in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
78. Precise market research was not introduced, but the district court found no evidence
that the WGN deal affected the value of the rights agreements with over-the-air network
NBC and another cable superstation, TBS (games shown on those stations were not shown
at the same time as Bulls games on WGN). See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 874 F.
Supp. 844, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev’d in part and remanded, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
Although this claim may appear superficially counter-intuitive, more careful
consideration provides the underlying business logic. Bidding for rights sales is highly
competitive among networks, and involves imperfect predictions of the economic value of
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sports leagues, significant transactions costs, that is, the inability of the
clubs to agree among themselves how to divide up the profits, appear to
have precluded an efficient arrangement here.79
Suppose, however, that the NBA were governed as is NASCAR and
the Indian Premier League (cricket) by an independent board of directors
responsible only to maximize profitability for the league as a whole.
Transaction costs problems would be solved: if selling Bulls games on
WGN produced more additional revenue than potential revenue losses from
other rights sales, the NBA would surely allow these games to be seen
nationally.
This case illustrates why a categorical approach is more appropriate
for antitrust litigation challenging sports league policies agreed to by selfinterested club owners. Since the Sherman Act is a consumer welfare
prescription,80 the antitrust laws ought to reflect a concern when consumers
are deprived of desired sports broadcasts because of bargaining
inefficiencies in a joint venture with market power. In such a case, the
hallmarks of an unreasonable trade restraint—an anti-consumer effect on
price, output, or responsiveness to consumer choice—would be present.81
A non-sports example provides the final illustration of how the
categorical approach assists courts in fulfilling the goals of § 1: the
ongoing litigation over fees charged to retailers to process credit card
purchases. A full examination of the myriad allegations of anticompetitive
conduct in this market is of course beyond the scope of this essay. To
grossly summarize, Visa and Mastercard originated as associations of
competing banks offering credit card processing services (in addition to the
actual provision of credit to consumers, for which consumers are directly
charged fees and interest on credit extended). Two distinct processing

the rights being acquired. Absent a strong likelihood that WGN superstation broadcast
would significantly hurt ratings for other games, bidders for those games are not likely to
take the WGN broadcasts into account. Bulls’ games shown on a local cable channel in
Chicago averaged 350,000 viewers, while Bulls’ games shown on WGN averaged 650,000
nationwide. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship. v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1349 (N.D. Ill.
1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). The trial court estimated that the viewership
outside Chicago after 1990 was 336,000, and WGN’s general manager estimated that at
least half of these viewers are in cities that do not have NBA teams. Id. Thus, an average of
less than 6000 viewers in each NBA city were watching each Bulls’ game. Even so, of
these fans, some were likely Bulls fans who would not have watched any other game in any
event. Many others were likely avid NBA fans, who likely watched the Bulls/WGN
broadcast in addition to watching their favorite local team. Thus, it is quite plausible that the
substitution effect of Bulls’ games for those sold by the NBA or other teams was minimal.
79. See Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross, Necessary Restraints and Inefficient
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 1 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 27 (2000) (discussing the English
Premier League example discussed in text accompanying supra note 23).
80. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
81. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
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services are offered by banks: “acquiring banks” settle accounts with
merchants, and then are reimbursed by “issuing banks,” who have a direct
relationship with the card-holding consumer. The “merchant discount” (the
amount less than the price charged to the consumer’s credit card actually
received by the merchant) reflects a variety of fees, including ones charged
by the acquiring bank, Visa or Mastercard, and the issuing bank.82
According to merchants and other critics of this process, a variety of
factors distort free market forces in this industry, resulting in claims that
these fees, and in particular the “interchange fee” charged by issuing banks,
are far too high in the United States.83 Visa and Mastercard control a huge
share of the market, dominance developed in part by exclusionary practices
that prevented rival card brands from developing relationships with banks.84
Both credit card companies require merchants to honor all cards carrying
their brand, even if the fees charged to the merchants vary widely. Most
significantly, both insert clauses in contracts with merchants that
significantly limit merchants’ ability to pass-on to consumers any reduced
fees that might induce them to use a particular bank’s credit card.85
Merchants have filed antitrust challenges to the interchange fees that
historically were fixed by competing banks participating in what were
structured as joint ventures. To avoid charges of price fixing, both Visa
and Mastercard restructured through initial public offerings, so that the
interchange fee is now fixed by separate corporate entities, rather than
competing banks. Are the defendants now a “single entity,” so that the
interchange fee, allegedly set at artificially high levels, is immune from
antitrust scrutiny?86
Professor Hovenkamp claims that American Needle should not
prevent courts from examining interchange fees under § 1.87 He argues that
82. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2008)
(providing a full background on the mechanics of the processing services offered and
interactions between banks). Many of these issues are currently pending in In re Payment
Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F.Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (concerning Sherman Act violations arising from processing fees charged by
providers of payment network services).
83. See Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5546, Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Antitrust Task Force, 110th Cong. 98–100 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of W. Stephen Cannon on Behalf of the Merchants Payments Coalition, Inc.
discussing the anti-competitive nature of interchange fees).
84. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2003).
85. Hearings, supra note 83.
86. If the interchange fee is set by a single entity, it is not an agreement among rival
banks subject to challenge under § 1; the high fees themselves cannot be the basis of
proving a violation of § 2, which focuses on unlawful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power, not the “mere possession” of that power by a monopolist. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
87. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13–14. For a similar conclusion,
see Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 871.
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rules that limit the independent businesses of participating banks should not
be treated any differently now that Visa and MasterCard are supposedly
independently owned.88
Governance is irrelevant because “the
corporation’s directors are obliged to maximize the corporation’s value,
which occurs when it achieves the cartel-like output.”89
My approach likely yields the same result, but via a different path. If
the Visa and MasterCard IPOs did nothing more than transfer cartel
management from competing banks to a separate entity whose economic
incentives were aligned with the desires of participating “issuing banks” to
charge excessive interchange fees, then the IPO itself should likely be
struck down, or at least the “veil” of independence pierced as a sham.90
But, according to MasterCard’s securities filings, the corporation’s
revenues are not based on a percentage of interchange fees or bank profits,
but rather “from the fees that we charge our customers for providing
transaction processing and other payment-related services (operations fees)
and by assessing our customers based primarily on the dollar volume of
activity on the cards that carry our brands (assessments).”91
If, as critics claim, there is evidence that the interchange fee is not at a
competitive level,92 then banks issuing MasterCard credit cards could
reduce their fee and permit merchants to pass on the savings to consumers,
which would result in more consumers using MasterCard credit cards. This
would increase the dollar volume of activity on MasterCard-branded cards,
and thus increase the profits for MasterCard. This analysis suggests that
the corporation’s value is not maximized by a cartel-like output, absent
collusion with its rival Visa. Rather, if the revenue model for the
corporation is primarily based on maximizing the dollar volume of card
activity, this puts the corporation in a typical arms-length, quasi-

88. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13–14.
89. Id.
90. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967) (holding that the
territorial limitations by licensees of the parent company should be treated as horizontal
violations of the Sherman Act). Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 824, make the
important point that if parties structure their economic activity as a joint venture vesting
complete control in an independent board, it does not necessarily mean that the conduct is
legal. They note that if rival firms simply formed a new corporation to control independent
firms’ output, the structure of the Board of Directors would be irrelevant. The tests
proposed in this Essay are appropriate only for agreements reflecting a genuine economic
integration that would otherwise be subject to the rule of reason.
91. MasterCard Worldwide, MasterCard Annual Report 2008, at 3 (2008),
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/newsroom/annual_report/MasterCard_Annual_
Report_2008.pdf.
92. These claims are seriously contested by those who claim either that the interchange
fee is not exploitive or that any regulation is worse than the harm. Sources on either side are
listed in Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 869 n.278.
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adversarial, vertical relationship with the issuing banks.93 But it suggests
that Hovenkamp is correct in his conclusion that MasterCard should not be
immune from § 1 scrutiny, because MasterCard has not made the slightest
effort to force banks to lower interchange fees. Assuming, arguendo,
evidence that the fees are not priced at competitive levels, although the
Board of Directors may formally be independent of the banks, the evidence
is inconsistent with the way we would expect a truly independent entity to
behave.
In addition to claiming that the fees are actually at competitive levels
(an issue to be resolved under a rule of a reason, given the plaintiffs’
plausible claim that the defendant is not a single entity), there remains
another potential reply from MasterCard: there is no reason to insist that
banks issuing MasterCards lower their interchange fees because both
MasterCard and Visa have contract provisions that prohibit merchants from
passing on reduced fees for their own cards or competing cards. Thus,
even if Bank of America lowered its fees on its Penn State affinity
MasterCard, the Nittany Lion Inn could not pass that fee savings on to
customers because of its contract with Visa. If this is true, then the
competitive problem is not with the fixing of interchange fees, but with this
tacit collusion between the two dominant credit card brands about highly
restrictive and anticompetitive terms. The bar on passing discounts onto
consumers should be independently challenged under § 194 or challenged
by the Federal Trade Commission as an unfair method of competition.

93. Cf. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977) (discussing the
similar relationship between manufacturers, who seek to maximize output of their products
given the wholesale price and retailers, whose margins manufacturers prefer to narrow).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,659-60
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (concerning government ordering modifications for company price books to
avoid antitrust violations and remarking that private suits should be brought independently).

ROSS_FINALIZED_FIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

286

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 14:1

CONCLUSION
In American Needle, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction
between business entities whose key decisions are controlled by a single
economic actor concerned solely with the profitability of the firm, and
entities whose key decisions are controlled by those with their own
individual profits apart from the venture’s economic welfare.95 Future
antitrust analysis should resolve defendants’ claims that a decision was not
an agreement subject to challenge under § 1 of the Sherman Act by
focusing on whether the decision was made by those with legal (fiduciary
duty) and economic incentives to advance the venture-as-a-whole.
Evidence that the decision is inconsistent with the best interests of the
venture-as-a-whole should lead courts to reject the single-entity defense.
The Court’s decision will hopefully draw renewed attention to
structural governance issues with regard to competitor collaborations where
inefficient governance will not lead to swift market retribution. Where
there is evidence that such a joint venture’s decisions are guided by
parochial self-interest of principals, courts should closely scrutinize
challenged decisions for their effect on price, output, quality, and
responsiveness to consumer demand.96 Where there is evidence of
persistent inefficiency, courts should consider structural relief.97
95. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010).
96. This approach sharply contrasts with what seems likely to be the latest strategy that
the clubs controlling the major sports leagues will adopt in the wake of their defeat on the
single entity defense in American Needle. Keyte, supra note 66, draws upon language in
several sports antitrust decisions to argue that many antitrust challenges to club owners’
decisions ought to be subject to a “quick look” review in favor of the defendant.
Unfortunately, his analysis fails to draw the critical distinction between agreements that
further the interests of the leagues as a whole (either by improving competition with other
sporting competitions or by increasing internal operational efficiency to the benefit of its
fans) and agreements that actually harm both consumers and the league as a whole but are
adopted in the parochial self-interest of owners. Cf. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096–
97 (discussing the NFL’s ownership restrictions and their effect on trade). Although a quick
look rejection of a challenge might be appropriate if the dispute was solely about whether a
particular owner would be an acceptable steward of a major franchise, see Levin v. NBA,
385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and indeed a single entity defense ought to apply if the
decision was made by a wholly disinterested board of directors of an independent
competition organizer, see Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient
Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the
United Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 243–44 (2006), Sullivan properly allowed a
jury to resolve the argument as to whether the rule’s primary effect was to further the
league’s interest in long-term growth or, as the plaintiff’s expert claimed, to shelter familyrun clubs from more efficient competition.
97. Werden, supra note 13, at 8, writes that when “the formation of a joint venture
yields obvious and substantial competitive benefits, only minimal antitrust analysis should
be required to conclude that the venture does not violate Section 1.” Similarly, the Justice
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This approach advances the Sherman Act’s goal of promoting
consumer welfare. It recognizes that, where consumers cannot easily shift
their patronage to substitute goods or services, a joint venture structured to
protect the parochial self-interest of its principals can reduce output and
render output unresponsive to consumer choice.

Department’s amicus brief in American Needle, supra note 58, at 16, opines that “where
teams have effectively merged an aspect of their operations”—that is, where they have
completely eliminated competition among themselves in that activity—post-“merger”
decisions that affect only that activity do not “raise the antitrust dangers that [Section] 1 was
designed to police.” (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
769). These somewhat blanket statements overlook the possibility that a venture’s
formation could be on balance welfare enhancing, but the venture may be structured in a
way that will significantly reduce the quantity or quality of output from the venture,
compared to “what would otherwise be.” Cf. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107
(1984). If a plaintiff can show that it is not reasonably necessary for the venture’s framers
to vest governance in those with parochial self-interest, and that such a structure is
demonstrably welfare-reducing compared to a venture structured to maximize the interests
of the venture as a whole, this showing should preclude any quick-look victory for the
defendant. And where rivals effectively merge an aspect of their operations subject to
“post-merger” decisions based on demonstrably output-reducing governance rules, these
rules do indeed raise the precise antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to protect.

